ABSTRACT Intelligent connected vehicles are autonomous vehicles. With the increasing degree of automation of autonomous vehicles and the development of open applications in the future, the computing tasks of autonomous vehicles are becoming more and more complex. In practice, the computing resources of vehicles are limited and the processing of data is not always guaranteed to be completed in time. However, the timely processing and integrity of the data are very important for vehicles because it affects the path selection of the traveling vehicle and the passenger experience. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce latency in processing data and verify the integrity of data for vehicles. In this paper, a novel message authentication scheme for multiple mobile devices in intelligent connected vehicles based on edge computing is proposed. The task of processing data in the vehicle is migrated to mobile devices, and tasks are executed utilizing the computing resources of multiple mobile devices in the edge computing model. The vehicle use certificateless ring signature technology to ensure the integrity of data processed by mobile devices. A security analyses show that our proposed schemes are secure in the random oracle model and can resist two types of adversaries under certificateless public key encryption. One type of adversary may be able to replace the mobile device's public key and the other type of adversary has access to the system master key. The results of performance analysis indicate the proposed scheme has high efficiency and applicability in practical intelligent connected vehicles system.
by companies such as Amazon, Google, Facebook, Baidu and so on, to enrich people's daily lives. However, cloud computing requires data to be uploaded to a remote cloud, resulting in potentially large data transmission delays and network bandwidth overload. To address these issues, there is an increasing focus on edge computing. Edge computing is an open platform which integrates network, computing, storage, and application core capabilities on the edge of the network near the source. With respect to the need for increased open applications on autonomous vehicles and the increased computing requirements in the future, we introduced mobile devices such as mobile phones under the model of edge computing in a previous work [3] to enhance the computing power of CAVs, as shown in FIGURE 1., where mobile devices connected with a CAV via WiFi, and CAVs are able to communicate with roadside units or a remote cloud using wireless technologies, e.g., 4G and dedicated short range communications (DSRC). It is important to introduce mobile devices as edge nodes to enhance the computing power of a CAV. The data response latency will be significantly reduced, especially on a bus, which usually has a large number of passengers with mobile phones. In such a model, the CAV assigns different tasks to mobile devices. Although the collaboration from mobile devices enhances a CAV's computing capability, it also brings about potential security issues with malicious mobile devices attempting to tamper or just randomly counterfeit the results of offloaded tasks. It is dangerous because an inaccurate path might be traced from an incorrect result of roadblock recognition. In this case, mobile devices need to sign messages, including task results, to maintain integrity, thus, CAVs need to execute authentication of messages. However, the signature of the message may enable a CAV to trace a mobile device's action. This means that the risk of privacy leakage of mobile devices exists, resulting in a low degree of mobile device participation. Thus, we also consider the privacy of mobile devices. In a previous study, the message was signed with a group signature, however, this conditional privacy protects the identity of the signer as the group manager can be traced back to the specific signer [8] . In the proposed model, the mobile device will send the message to the vehicle through ring signature technology to protecting the identity privacy of the mobile device and if the mobile device is malicious and the message is incomplete, the trusted authority (TA) can trace it by the mobile device's pseudonym.
In this paper, we propose a novel message authentication scheme for multiple mobile devices in intelligent connected vehicles based on edge computing (MA-DVEC) and we also propose an improved message authentication scheme, which is supporting batch authentication. The main contributions of our proposed schemes are summarized as follows:
• Firstly, we propose the MA-DVEC scheme and introduce the concept of edge computing. To facilitate edge computing well, we focus on adding mobile devices as edge devices to the intelligent connected vehicles system to obtain real-time message for vehicles. Therefore, a message authentication scheme based on edge computing is proposed.
• Secondly, we use certificateless ring signature to improve efficiency and security in the MA-DVEC scheme. The proposed message authentication based on certificateless public key cryptosystem avoids the overhead of managing certificates. Our scheme adopts a technology of ring signature, which is self-organizing and neither ring members nor the vehicle track specific signers to guaranteeing the privacy preserving of mobile devices.
• Finally, we present a security analysis of the proposed scheme, which shows that it is provably secure under the random oracle model. Meanwhile, we implement performance analysis to compare our schemes with previous message authentication schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In order to facilitate understanding, we introduce related works in Section II and propose some preliminary knowledge in Section III. We propose the MA-DVEC scheme in Section IV and introduce an improved scheme in Section V. Section VI introduces the security analysis of the proposed scheme and we present performance analysis in Section VII. Finally, we make a conclusion of this paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATE WORKS
The IEEE 802.11 standards committee established in 1991 adopted the term ''Ad hoc network'' to describe the particular peer-to-peer wireless mobile network. Ad hoc is a P2P connection and cannot communicate with other networks. All nodes in the network have equal status, and no need to set any central control nodes to automatically form an independent network, which is mainly used in sensor networks and vehicular networks such as [9] , [10] . In [9] , He et al. proposed a public auditing scheme for wireless body area networks based on Ad hoc networks, which could improve medical care and the monitoring of patients. In [10] , Dietzel et al. proposed the aggregation of the vehicle networks based on Ad hoc networks, which could improve communication efficiency by summarizing information that is exchanged between vehicles. One of the characteristics of the Ad Hoc networks is that it is less secure and vulnerable to eavesdropping and attacks. Therefore, it is necessary to study the security architecture and technology applicable to the vehicle networks based on Ad Hoc networks.
The vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) consist of an on-board unit, a roadside unit (RSU), a trusted authority and an application server, in order to improve safety communication, vehicles to vehicles and vehicles to RSU should to achieve message authentication. He et al. propose [11] , which is a public key cryptography (PKC)-based authentication scheme. The PKC-based authentication scheme will bring problems in certificate management. Therefore, the previous proposed authentication scheme unsuitable for message authentication.
To address the certificate management problem which has been brought by the PKC-based authentication scheme. In 1985, Shamir has been proposed the concept of identity-based cryptosystems [12] . In the identity-based cryptosystems, the mobile device's identity information (e.g., identification number, cell phone number and email.) can be as the mobile device's public key. Therefore, it avoid the drawbacks of the management of a large number of mobile devices' certificates in the traditional public key cryptosystems. Whereafter, many identity-based encryption schemes have been proposed [13] - [15] . To address the problem that certificate management with message authentication in PKC mechanism, some identity-based message authentication scheme have been proposed [16] - [18] . Tiwari et al. [16] proposed scheme more suitable for high traffic area and provides cost effective, highly privacy preserving of user, efficient message authentication and verification than existing system for VANETs. Wang and Yao [17] also proposed the scheme of message authentication is based on identity and in the identity-based schemes, every vehicle holds too many valid identities in order to protect privacy. Later, Biswas et al. [18] proposed an identity-based authentication scheme for safety messages in WAVE-enabled VANETs and has been proved that the scheme is resilient to all major security threats in the paper. However, the identity-based message authentication scheme also bring the problem of key escrow.
To solve the prolem of key escrow, in 2013, Al-Riyami and Paterson [19] first proposed the concept of certificateless public key encryption. The user's private key consists of two parts: one is the information by the user and the other is generated by the key generate center. Later, the certificateless-based encryption scheme has been address the certificate management issue which is based on the PKC encryption scheme and solves the key escrow problem caused by the identity-based encryption scheme. Therefore, many certificateless-based encryption schemes are proposed [20] - [22] , [31] .
Because the vehicle has limited resources, an edge computing model [23] has appeared. Whereafter, a message authentication scheme based on edge computing is proposed [24] , where edge nodes assists the RSU in message authentication.
The specific process is the trusted authority selects part of vehicles as the edge nodes and sends the result of message authentication to the RSU, then the RSU verifies the correctness of the result and finally broadcasts the result to vehicles. As open applications increase, edge nodes not only assist message authentication, mobile devices join around the autonomous driving vehicle as edge devices and participate in the execution of computing tasks of the vehicle. The vehicle do not needs send data to the vehicle computing unit and performs centralized processing, therefore, it is easier to meet the real-time nature of autonomous driving under the edge computing model.
III. PRELIMINARIES
To improve the understanding of our schemes, in this section, we will introduce preliminaries of knowledge as mathematical background, system model and security requirements of the proposed scheme.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
A q is a large prime number, we assume G 1 , G 2 , G T are three cyclic multiplicative groups with the same order q and set a and b are random numbers of Z * q . If a map e : G 1 ×G 2 → G T satisfies the following three conditions, we called it's a bilinear pairing.
2) Non-degeneracy: Existing Q ∈ G 1 , P ∈ G 2 , and there satisfy the inequation e(P, Q) = 1;
3) Computability: For all Q ∈ G 1 , P ∈ G 2 , there exists an effective algorithm to compute e(P, Q).
It is hard to find an algorithm to solve the following problems in polynomial time:
• Discrete logarithm problem: For two random elements P ∈ G 2 , Q ∈ G 1 , it is hard to find an integer n ∈ Z * q satisfies equation Q = nP.
• Computational Diffe Hellman Problem(co-CDHP): For three random points P, aP ∈ G 2 and Q ∈ G 1 , it's hard to compute aQ in polynomial time, where a ∈ Z * q .
B. SYSTEM MODEL
In our proposed scheme, the system model consists of three entities, including TA, vehicle and mobile devices, which can be formed into three layers. As shown in FIGURE 2., the top layer is the TA, which is a fully trusted entity and usually hosted into a remote cloud. The second layer is the vehicle, the vehicle has limited storage resources and computing capability. However, mobile devices may be malicious and tamped messages cause the false result. The bottom layer includes many mobile devices, where we set mobile devices as edge devices, they have enough storage and computing capabilities and can execute different tasks which are come from vehicles. Therefore, the aim of our proposed scheme is checked message integrity, which has been stored or computed by different mobile devices. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. System model.
1) TA
The TA is a trusted entity, which used to generate system public parameters, semi-private keys and pseudonyms for mobile devices according to the mobile devices' requirement and their real identity. The TA maintains a revocation list and initiates the list is empty, which the list includes malicious mobile devices' real identity and a series pseudonym. According to the list of the mobile devices' revocation, the TA could trace malicious mobile devices.
2) VEHICLE
The vehicle is a limited storage resources and computing capability entity and equivalent to the user whose messages are stored in the mobile device. Because mobile devices have enough storage and computing capabilities, the vehicle could separate tasks to mobile devices and obtain messages, which has been processed. However, before receiving the message, the vehicle should check the integrity of messages stored on mobile devices.
3) MOBILE DEVICE
A mobile device is a user who has themselves electronic equipment (e.g., mobile phone, laptop, iPads.) and could support enough storage and computing resources as the edge devices in edge computing model. It's a malicious entity. Every mobile device has a trusted execution environment and before access, it must input the right password. In order to secure communication with the vehicle, mobile devices should use pseudonyms which have generated by the TA.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The security requirements of our proposed scheme are to satisfy the certificateless signature fundamental privacy preserving and tracking malicious mobile devices. The proposed MA-DVEC scheme consists of three entities TA, mobile device and vehicle, where the TA is an absolutely trusted entity, the mobile device is a malicious entity and the vehicle needs handle a lot of messages. Therefore, the concrete describes security requirements as follows:
1) Message authentication and integrity: To ensure that the vehicle could get complete data. It is necessary to provide a message authentication scheme between the vehicle and multiple mobile devices for a intelligent connected vehicles system.
2) Conditional privacy preserving: Any vehicle unknown the real identity of the signer complete achieve protect mobile devices privacy during the process of check the integrity of the stored message. However, when there are some malicious mobile devices, the TA can extract the real identity from the pseudo identity of the mobile device.
3) Identity privacy preserving: The real identity of mobile devices are not in any transmitted message. All other mobile devices and any third party except the TA cannot obtain the real identity of the mobile device from the transmitted message.
4) Unforgeability: Mobile devices signature a message and cannot be forged by a third party adversary, satisfy this requirement is easier to achieve retrospect the malicious mobile device. 5) Revocation: After the vehicle found a malicious mobile device, the TA could retrospect malicious mobile device's real identity. That is, TA could revoke malicious mobile device and prevent tampering other valid messages. 6) Unlinkability: An adversary cannot link various relative information to achieve the purpose of tracking mobile device, satisfy this requirement aim to protect mobile device's privacy.
IV. SCHEME
In this section, we aim to propose a novel message authentication scheme for multiple mobile devices in intelligent connected vehicles based on edge computing. The scheme supports the vehicle and multiple mobile devices communication, and it consists of five phases: Setup, Register, Ring signature, Verify, Revocation.
A. SETUP
The TA executes this algorithm to generate system public parameters and the master key and sends system parameters to the vehicle and mobile devices by the secure channel, which are specified describe as follows:
1) Input a security parameter l, then the TA chooses a large prime number q > 2 l , and three cyclic multiplicative groups
2) The TA chooses a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 2 → G T , and Q, P are generators of G 1 , G 2 respectively.
3) The TA determines two one way hash functions h and
The TA selects a random number k ∈ Z * q as the master key, and generate PK TA = k · P as the public key. Then the TA returns system parameters (q, P, Q, G 1 , G 2 , h, H , PK TA ).
B. REGISTER
Mobile devices interact with the TA to execute this algorithm. The TA generates mobile device's pseudonyms and semi-private key. The algorithm includes four phases: mobile device secret value, mobile device public value, generate pseudonyms and semi-private key extract.
1) MOBILE DEVICE SECRET VALUE
The mobile device i have a trusted execution environment, where pw is the login password, RI D i is the mobile device's real identity. In the trusted execution environment, the mobile device chooses a random number u ∈ Z * q as the mobile device's secret value, where the mobile device sets SK i,1 = u.
2) MOBILE DEVICE PUBLIC VALUE
The mobile device i computes PK i = u · Q and sets it as the mobile device's public key.
3) GENERATE PSEUDONYMS
The mobile device i obtains pseudonyms by sent (RI D i , h(pw ⊕ a), PK i ) to the TA, where a ∈ Z * q is a large random number was chosen by the mobile device. Then the TA computes:
where r j is a random number r j ∈ Z * q , then the TA computes R j = r j · P · Q, j = 1 . . . p it indicates that a mobile device i has p pseudonyms. In order to convenient, we set
Then the TA sends (I D i,j , h i , R j ) to the mobile device simultaneously and the mobile device stores this information in a trusted execution environment, meanwhile the TA stores the (
the mobile device checks I D i,j firstly, then checks it whether are legitimate:
If the equation is true, the mobile device computes:
Then the mobile device stores p pseudonyms in a trusted execution environment. In the subsequent sections, it will be as real pseudonyms.
4) SEMI-PRIVATE KEY EXTRACT
The mobile device requests semi-private key extract by the mobile device selects an I D i and sends (I D i , PK i ) to the TA, when the TA received the request, firstly, to check the following equation whether is legitimate:
If the equation is true, the TA computes:
Then send (I D i , SK i,2 ) to the mobile device. When the mobile device received it and checks:
If the equation is true, the mobile device stores SK i,2 and sets
as the mobile device's private key and stores it in a trusted execution environment.
C. RING SIGNATURE
The mobile device executes this algorithm to generate the message signature. The message m is a result of a mobile device to storage or computing task and send it to the vehicle.
3) The mobile device chooses two random numbers x, y ∈ Z * q , and computes
The vehicle executes this algorithm to check the integrity of the message. 2
3) The vehicle checks the equation whether is legitimate:
If the above equation is legitimate, it means that the message m was corrected storage or the calculation task has been finished without tampered and return ''true'', else return ''false''. The verification process as follows:
E. REVOCATION
When the equation (7) returns ''true'', it means that the message is legal. If the equation (7) There is a problem of inefficiency in this scheme. In the next section, we present an improved scheme. In order to improve the efficiency of detection, when the vehicle receives multiple messages and needs to be detected, batch verify is used and as long as the detection once time, which greatly improves the efficiency.
V. IMPROVED SCHEME
If the vehicle needs to couple many information and separate different tasks to different mobile devices and mobile devices couple these tasks simultaneously, in order to improve verify results with efficiency, we propose the second scheme, which is an improved scheme and batch detection message has been implemented. It consists of five phases: Setup, Register, Ring signature, Verify, Revocation. ( The improved scheme and the previous scheme are the same in the Setup, Register and Ring signature phases, so no longer write in the following. )
A. IMPROVED VERIFY
The vehicle executes this algorithm to checks the integrity of the aggregated message M. The message M is aggregated from the relevant parameters of the chosen c messages. Therefore, the vehicle only executes the verification phase once time. Improved the efficiency of the verification phase. 1) Aggregate: The vehicle chooses c messages to aggregate a message M and other relative parameters: 3) Input (M , PK 1 , PK 2 , . . . , PK n , I D s , S i ), the vehicle
4) The vehicle checks the equation whether is legitimate:
If the above equation is legitimate, it means that the aggregated message M was corrected storage or the calculation task has been finished without tampered and return ''true'', else return ''false''. The verification process as follows:
When the equation (9) returns ''true'', it means that the aggregated message is legal. If the equation (9) 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed two schemes.
A. SECURITY MODEL
A certificateless cryptography scheme exists two type adversaries. Type I adversary A 1 does not know the system master key but can replace the mobile device's public key. Type II adversary A 2 knows the system master key, but cannot replace the target mobile device's public key. According to the ability of the adversary can be divided into a normal adversary, a strong adversary, and a super adversary. Our scheme resists super adversaries, which are defined the game between the two types adversaries and the challenger C. C executes the Setup algorithm to generate system parameters and the master key. Then, if the inquirer is a type I adversary, C returns the system parameters; else, returns the system parameters and the master key. An adversary could access the following random oracles: 1) Mobile device secret value oracle: Upon receiving a query with the real identity RI D i of the adversary A, the challenger C returns secret key SK i,1 to A.
2) Mobile device public key replacement oracle: When A makes the query of the public key with the real identity RI D i and PK i , then C returns the replaced public key PK * i to A. 
Finally, the adversary A outputs (m i
The adversary wins the game if the following conditions are met:
2) For the type I adversary, I D i * has never been sent to the semi-private key oracle, otherwise, I D i * has never been sent to the secret value oracle.
B. SECURITY PROOF
This section aims to proof our schemes are secure under two type adversaries in the random oracle environment. In the process, there are two parties to participate: the adversary A and the challenger C.
Lemma 1: Our proposed scheme is secure against type I adversary if solve the co-CDHP is difficult.
Proof: Assume the adversary A could successfully forge a signature of the message and the challenger C can call the adversary A's attack algorithm to output the solution of the co-CDH problem. In this process, the adversary A could execute the following queries: Signature query: Upon receiving a message m request to execute the signature algorithm, the adversary A calls the forge algorithm to generate the signature.
2) The mobile device chooses two random numbers x, y ∈ Z * q , executes h query and H query respectively. Then 
Finally: the challenger C could obtain two signatures of the message m, for i ∈ [1, n], i = s, h i = h * i , according to the equations (8), (11) and computes (8)/(11) as follows:
According to the equation (12) we can obtains:
s ) The challenger C could outputs u · P indicates that C could solve the co-CDHP. We assume to solve the co-CDHP is hard, so our proposed scheme is secure in the random oracle.
Lemma 1 * : Our proposed the improved scheme is secure against type I adversary if solve the co-CDHP is difficult.
Proof: As it does the previous lemma 1, A and C are the parties to do the game, besides the previous queries A also calls the following query:
Improved Signature query: Upon receiving multiple messages m i requests to execute the signature algorithm, VOLUME 7, 2019 where i ∈ [1, c] , the adversary A calls the forge algorithm to generate the signature.
1) For
2) The mobile device chooses two random numbers x, y ∈ Z * q , executes h query and H query respectively. Then
For c messages, the vehicle aggregates a message M and other relative parameters:
Finally: the challenger C could obtain two signatures of the message M, for i ∈ [1, n], i = s, h i,s = h * i,s , according to the equations (10), (13) and computes (10)/(13) as follows:
According to the equation (14) we can obtains:
The challenger C could outputs u · P indicates that C could solve the co-CDH problem. We assume to solve the co-CDHP is hard, so our proposed the improved scheme is secure against type I adversary in the random oracle.
Lemma 2: Our proposed scheme is secure against type II adversary if solve the co-CDHP is hard.
Proof: The adversary A is an insider attacker from the TA in the register. We aim to proof our scheme is secure against the second adversary, so assume A could access the system master key, but cannot replace the target mobile device's public key. Set the challenger C's identity is RI D * and maintains three tables (RI D i , k) , where initialize it to empty. 
Finally, According to [25] , A can forge a pseudonym identity with the different coefficient t of PK i :
According to the equations (15) and (16), we can obtain:
The challenger C could output u · P indicates that C could solve the co-CDH problem. We assume to solve the co-CDHP is hard, so our proposed scheme is secure against type II adversary in the random oracle. The improved scheme and the previous scheme proof process are same and not write it here.
C. OTHER DISCUSSIONS 1) MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION AND INTEGRITY
The proposed scheme is a message authentication scheme based on certificateless ring signature. The vehicle verifies the message signed by multiple mobile devices before receiving the message. Therefore, the integrity of the message received by the vehicle is guaranteed.
2) CONDITIONAL PRIVACY PRESERVING
In our proposed scheme, the pseudonym of each mobile device includes the TA's master key k and the mobile device's own semi-private key u. The master key and the semiprivate key are known only to the TA and the mobile device, respectively. Therefore, it is impossible for any adversary to calculate the pseudonym. When a malicious mobile device appears, the TA can obtain the real identity of the mobile device by calculating:
3) IDENTITY PRIVACY PRESERVING
Each mobile device in the proposed scheme communicates with the vehicle under a pseudonym, where
The message transmitted by the communication does not contain the true identity of the mobile device, which cannot be obtained by other mobile devices or any third party from the pseudonym.
4) UNFORGEABILITY
Through the proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 1 * , we can obtain a conclusion that the proposed scheme is unforgeability.
5) REVOCATION
when the vehicle founds a malicious mobile device, by executing the revocation algorithm, then could extract its real identity of the TA, so, the proposed scheme is satisfied revocation.
6) UNLINKABILITY
The pseudonym identity generated by the equation
where r j is a random number, any adversary cannot link various relative information to achieve the purpose of tracking mobile devices, so, the proposed scheme is to satisfy unlinkability.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we specific analysis of the performance of the proposed MA-DVEC scheme and the improved scheme. In order to have better credibility, we compare the performance of the proposed two schemes with [14] and [26] , [27] . To demonstrate the efficiency of our message authentication scheme, we use the simulation parameters in [28] . In one area of the network, a service provider manages 5 small edge areas, each of which has 8 GHz/ea computing resources through multiple mobile devices. Generally, the computer runs in 4G memory to simulate the computing resources of a vehicle. In 5 edge regions, the computational task scheduling of vehicles is similar to the computational task migration in [29] .
A. COMPUTATION COST ANALYSIS
We use a bilinear pairing: e : G 2 ×G 2 → G T , which can reach 80 bits security levels for identity-based schemes. G 2 is a cyclic multiplication group generated by the generator P with the order is q, where P and q are two prime number, 512 bits, and 160 bits respectively. For our proposed schemes based on bilinear pairing, we use a bilinear pairing: e : G 1 ×G 2 → G T , where G 1 is a cyclic multiplication group generated by the generator Q with the order is q, where Q is a prime number of 128 bits. As shown in TABLE 1, which the platform of 3.4GHZ i7-4770 [30] , we can obtain basic cryptographic operations execution time by using MIRACL library [32] . According to the cryptographic operation type and processing efficiency in each algorithm, compare the time cost for five schemes in the signature phase, verify a single message and batch verification messages, as shown in TABLE 2. In order to more intuitively show the effect of the number of messages on the delay and we made three figures, where FIGURE 3. is compared execution time in the signature phase, FIGURE 4. is compared execution time in the verification phase and FIGURE 5. is compared execution time for the batch authentication. In the signature phase, since the computational costs of the two schemes proposed in the paper are the same, only one of them is represented in the figure. Therefore, we will compare the proposed improvement scheme with [14] , [26] , [27] . The comparison results of the four schemes are shown in FIGURE 3., we can see that the Jiang et al. ' [26] in the signature phase and our proposed schemes performance time are a little better than [14] , [26] , [27] . The computational efficiency of our second scheme in this phase has been improved 84.24% than [26] , higher 49.85% than [27] and higher 56.17% than [14] .
In FIGURE 4., we compared the previous scheme of this paper cannot implement batch authentication and the improved scheme of achieving batch authentication. It is explained that the efficiency of the scheme implements batch authentication is far higher than the general message authentication scheme.
For the schemes of Chim et al. [26] , Jiang et al. [27] , Horng et al. [14] and our propose the improved scheme are achieved batch authentication. We set c to denote the number of signatures aggregated by the vehicle. In order to improve the efficiency of message authentication, let the number of aggregated signatures is equal to the total number of messages, where m represents the number of messages. Because the previous scheme in this paper did not implement batch authentication, therefore, comparison of execution time for the batch verification of four schemes is shown in FIGURE 5. We can see from the figure, the Jiang et al.'s [27] execution time is more than the Chim et al.'s [26] and the Horng et al.'s [14] in the batch authentication phase, our proposed schemes performance time are better than [14] , [26] and [27] . The computational efficiency of our second scheme in this phase has been improved 82.19% than [26] , superior 37.85% than [27] and higher 70.58% than [14] .
B. COMMUNICATION COST ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we analyze the communication cost for five schemes. Since the length of P,Q are 512 bits, 128 bits respectively, so the length of elements of G 1 , G 2 corresponding to 32 bytes, 128 bytes. We set timestamp is 4 bytes, a generic hash function output value is 20 bytes. 
, T i is 4 bytes and denotes timestamp. Therefore, the communication cost is 128 × 3 + 4 = 388 bytes. For the proposed two schemes in this paper, the vehicle received the pseudonym identity, message, signature, and public key {I D i , M , (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , N , L), (PK 1 , PK 2 , . . . , PK n )}, where S i , PK i ∈ G 1 , I D i ∈ G 2 . Therefore, the communication cost is 128 + 64n bytes.
The communication overhead of the two schemes proposed in this paper is the same and compared with [14] , [26] , [27] are reduced corresponding to 50%, 52.94%, 50.52%, where these percentage results are in the case of n = 1, as the number of n increases, the communication cost of our proposed schemes will also increase. Compared with [14] , [26] , [27] , our second scheme is to provide high security in a highbandwidth environment with a small communication cost and our schemes are guaranteed the privacy of mobile devices.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is very important to improve the efficiency of message authentication in intelligent connected vehicles. In this paper, we propose the MA-DVEC scheme. By introducing edge computing, vehicles can send messages to mobile devices for processing data instead of sending them to the cloud for centralized processing. The secure communication between vehicle and multiple mobile devices is realized by certificateless ring signature technology. The security analysis shows that we can prove that our proposed two schemes are secure under the random oracle model and can resist two types of adversaries under certificateless public key encryption. The performance analysis supports that the improved scheme is better than traditional schemes and improves the efficiency of message authentication. Therefore, the improved scheme is more suitable for deployment in intelligent connected vehicles. 
